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Abstract According to recent embodied cognition theories,
mental concepts are represented by modality-specific
sensory-motor systems. Much of the evidence for
modality-specificity in conceptual processing comes from
the property-verification task. When applying this and other
tasks, it is important to select items based on their modality-
exclusivity. We collected modality ratings for a set of 387
properties, each of which was paired with two different
concepts, yielding a total of 774 concept-property items.
For each item, participants rated the degree to which the
property could be experienced through five perceptual
modalities (vision, audition, touch, smell, and taste). Based
on these ratings, we computed a measure of modality
exclusivity, the degree to which a property is perceived
exclusively through one sensory modality. In this paper, we
briefly sketch the theoretical background of conceptual
knowledge, discuss the use of the property-verification task
in cognitive research, provide our norms and statistics, and
validate the norms in a memory experiment. We conclude
that our norms are important for researchers studying
modality-specific effects in conceptual processing.
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Introduction
People understand and interact with their environment by
using conceptual knowledge about objects and their
properties. According to various models of conceptual
representation (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998; Farah &
McClelland, 1991; Humphreys & Forde, 2001), concepts
can be described as distributed patterns of activation across
units representing semantic features. Several of these
models propose that at least a subset of the features are
modality-specific (e.g., Cree & McRae, 2003; Plaut, 2002;
Rogers et al., 2004; Vigliocco, Vinson, Lewis, & Garrett,
2004). This is consistent with the embodied cognition view
on mental representation (e.g., Barsalou, 1999, 2008a;
Grush, 2004), which proposes that concepts are grounded
in sensory-motor processing. According to this view, object
concepts are learned through recurrent experiences of
perceiving and interacting with a particular object. During
those experiences, the patterns of activity in sensory-motor
brain areas are captured and stored in memory to form
elaborated, multimodal knowledge structures, called simu-
lators. Representation is achieved by reactivating a subset
of this stored knowledge to construct a specific simulation.
The exact content of a particular simulation depends on the
individual’s experience with the simulated concept, as well
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as on situational factors such as current goals and task
demands. As a result, each simulation is unique.
A method often used to assess conceptual knowledge
about objects and their properties is the property-
verification task. In this task, the word for a concept (e.g.,
banana) is presented together with the word for a property
that might be true (e.g., yellow) or false (e.g., blue) for the
concept. Participants have to judge whether the property is
true or false as quickly as possible. According to the
simulation theory, the response time reflects the effort
required to form an adequate simulation of the concept and
property. Since simulation is analogous to sensory-motor
processing, this theory predicts that the response time is
affected by factors that also influence perception and
action. For example, Solomon and Barsalou (2004) found
that property-verification response times depend on percep-
tual factors such as the size and perceptual salience of a
property.
Given that representations are flexible and task-dependent
(e.g., Barclay, Bransford, Franks, McCarrel, & Nitsch, 1974;
Barsalou, 1993), a simulation may be dominated by one
sensory modality, with other modalities engaged to a lesser
extent. For example, when performing a property-
verification task, one may form different simulations of
SAXOPHONE,1 depending on the property to be verified. In
order to verify that a SAXOPHONE is shiny, a predominantly
visual simulation is created, whereas to verify that a
SAXOPHONE sounds loud, a predominantly auditory
simulation is created. Evidence for such flexible and task-
dependent recruitment of modality-specific features in
representations is provided by the modality-switch effect. If
two representations are simulated by different modality-
specific systems, then constructing them consecutively will
involve a switch of attention from one modality to another.
This will result in a longer reaction time and/or a lower
accuracy, similar to modality-switching costs in perceptual
tasks (Spence, Nicholls, & Driver, 2001). Conceptual
modality-switch effects have been found in various
property-verification studies (e.g., Marques, 2006; Pecher,
Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2003; Pecher, Van Dantzig, &
Schifferstein, 2009; Vermeulen, Corneille & Niedenthal,
2008). Other studies demonstrated direct interactions be-
tween conceptual processing and perceptual processing,
providing even stronger evidence for the theory that the
sensory-motor system is involved in conceptual representa-
tion (Van Dantzig, Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2008;
Vermeulen et al., 2008). Brain imaging studies have
provided corroborative evidence. Goldberg, Perfetti, and
Schneider (2006) applied functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) to scan participants during a property-
verification task that involved properties from four different
sensory modalities (vision, sound, touch, and taste). When
participants verified properties from these modalities, activ-
ity was recorded in corresponding sensory areas. Thus,
verification of visual properties caused activation of visual
brain areas, whereas verification of auditory properties
caused activation of auditory brain areas. Similar results
were found by Simmons et al. (2007) and Kan, Barsalou,
Solomon, Minor, and Thompson-Schill (2003). In addition,
Cree and McRae (2003), see also Plaut (2002) showed that
damage to modality-specific sensory areas may lead to
semantic deficits. In sum, multiple studies provide evidence
that conceptual representation takes place in the modality-
specific brain areas that are also used during actual
experience of instances of the represented concepts.
As has become clear, the property-verification task is
well suited to the assessment of conceptual knowledge.
When applying the task to study modality-specific process-
ing, one should realize that property-verification items vary
widely in their degree of modality-exclusivity. Whereas
some properties are perceived exclusively by one specific
sensory modality (e.g., PIANO-black is purely visual),
others may be perceived by multiple modalities (e.g.,
SHOWER-splashing may be perceived by vision, audition,
and touch). It is therefore important to carefully select items
based on their modality-exclusivity. Lynott and Connell
(2009) found that controlling property-verification items for
modality-exclusivity results in a markedly larger modality-
switch effect (in terms of effect size). During pilot studies
in our own lab, we also found that the size of the modality-
switch effect depended on the modality-exclusivity of the
items used (e.g., Van Dantzig et al., 2008).
In the present study, in order to select concept-property
items on modality-exclusivity, we obtained modality ratings
for a large set of items. For each item, participants rated the
degree to which the property could be perceived through five
different senses (vision, audition, touch, smell, and taste). The
modality ratings form a significant extension of those
collected by Lynott and Connell (2009). In particular, while
they obtained ratings for isolated properties (e.g., yellow),
we obtained ratings for concept-property combinations (e.g.,
BANANA-yellow). It is important to realize that a property is
never experienced in isolation, but is always connected to a
particular object. In representation, independent simulators
may exist for properties (Barsalou, 2008b). However, since
simulation is a dynamic process, property-verification does
not involve the activation of invariant representations of
concepts and properties (Barsalou, 2009). Instead, the
representations of the concept and property mutually
constrain each other’s content. Thus, the concept WINE is
represented differently when one has to verify the property
white than when one has to verify the property sweet
1 Throughout this article, we use uppercase italics to represent
concepts, lowercase italics to represent properties, and quotes to
represent linguistic forms (words, sentences).
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(Pecher, Zanolie, & Zeelenberg, 2007; Pecher, Zeelenberg,
& Barsalou, 2004). Conversely, the property white is
represented differently for the concept WINE than for the
concept SNOW (Halff, Ortony, & Anderson, 1976; Solomon
& Barsalou, 2001). In an experiment by Murphy and
Andrew (1993) participants provided synonyms or antonyms
for adjectives that were presented in conjunction with a
concept, e.g., fresh WATER, fresh AIR or fresh BREAD. The
concept strongly influenced which synonyms and antonyms
were provided for a particular adjective. The degree to which
a specific sensory modality is involved in perceiving a
particular property may also differ across concepts. For
example, the property hot for the concept LIGHTBULB is
perceived almost exclusively by touch, as is well known by
anyone who has ever burnt their fingers unscrewing a lamp.
Fortunately, in other objects the property hot may also be
seen (as in a red-hot GRILL or a steaming mug of COFFEE)
or heard (as in a sizzling-hot PAN), so that we do not always
have to find out the hard way. Strictly speaking, in these
situations it is not the actual property hot that is perceived
visually or auditorily, but another visual (steaming, red) or
auditory (sizzling) property that merely indicates the hotness
of the object. However, according to the simulation theory,
property-verification involves simulating a (partial and
schematic) sensory-motor experience, by reactivating pat-
terns laid down during earlier experiences. As a result,
properties (steaming, sizzling) that frequently co-occurred
with the target property (hot) during those experiences may
also be included in the simulation and may be used to
indicate the presence of the target property. Thus, whereas
the property hot in itself is exclusively tactile, in a property-
verification task it may be associated with other-modality
properties, just as in real experience. The degree to which a
particular property is perceived by one or (indirectly) by
multiple sensory modalities may vary across concepts.
To capture this variability in property meaning, we
paired each property with two concepts, resulting in two
different concept-property items. For example, the property
plain was paired with the concept FOOD and with the
concept FABRIC. For each concept-property item, partic-
ipants rated the degree to which the property is experienced
through five different sensory modalities (vision, audition,
touch, smell, and taste). This resulted in a specific modality
profile for each item, a five-dimensional vector representing
the mean strength ratings on all five modalities. The
modality with the highest rating was defined as the
dominant modality for that item. Item pairs could be
unidominant, with both items having the same dominant
modality (e.g., pink FLAMINGO and pink COTTON
CANDY are both predominantly visual) or bidominant, with
the two items having different dominant modalities (e.g.,
plain FABRIC and plain FOOD are predominantly visual
and gustatory, respectively). Additionally, we computed the
angle between the two vectors of each item pair, as well as
the cosine of this angle. These measures indicate how
similar the modality profiles of the two items of a pair are.
Finally, we computed modality-exclusivity scores for each
concept-property item, indicating to what extent properties
are perceived exclusively by one modality. When compar-
ing our data with those of Lynott and Connell (2009), some
interesting patterns arose. In the remainder of this paper, we
describe how the norms were collected and we provide the
obtained ratings and statistics. Furthermore, the norms were
validated in a memory experiment. During the study phase
of this experiment, property words were presented together
with one of their two normed concepts (e.g., “plain food”).
Subsequently, memory for the property words was tested
using a cued recognition test in which the property was
presented either with the same concept word as in the study
phase (“plain food”) or with the other concept of the item
pair (“plain fabric”). When the concept was repeated,
recognition of the property word was better than when the
concept was switched. More interestingly, this effect was
influenced by the similarity of the modality profiles of an
item pair; the switch cost was larger for items with very
different modality profiles (e.g., plain fabric – plain food)
than for items with highly similar modality profiles (e.g.,
grey elephant – grey pebble). This result indicates that our
norms reflect actual differences in the representation of
properties and concepts.
Norming study
Stimuli We selected 387 properties that could be experi-
enced through one or more sensory modalities. Of these
387 items, 364 properties were obtained from the set of
Lynott and Connell (2009) and the remaining 23 properties
had been used in earlier studies in our lab. Each of the
properties was paired with two different concepts, yielding
a total number of 774 concept-property items. The set of
items was divided into ten different lists that consisted of 77
items (six lists) or 78 items (four lists) each. Properties and
concepts were never repeated within a list. Participants
received only one list, such that they never rated the same
property or concept twice. The complete set of items is
available in Electronic supplementary material.
Participants Four hundred thirty-one undergraduate stu-
dents from the University of California, San Diego
participated in the experiment in return for course credits.
Given that there were 10 different lists of items, each item
was rated by at least 40 participants.
Procedure The procedure was similar to that used by
Lynott and Connell (2009). The E-Prime 2.0 software
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package (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA) was
used to present the items and collect the participants’
responses. Concept-property items were presented in
random order. During each trial, a screen was presented
with the text “To what extent do you experience [concept]
being [property]?” (e.g., “To what extent do you experience
a banana being yellow?”). This text was followed by five
separate rating scales for each perceptual modality, labeled
“by feeling through touch”, “by hearing”, “by seeing”, “by
smelling”, and “by tasting”. To avoid any order effects, the
order of the rating scales was randomly determined for each
participant. Participants rated the extent to which they
would experience the property through each of the five
senses from 0 (not at all) to 5 (greatly), by clicking on the
corresponding number with the computer mouse. Once the
property had been rated on all five modalities, the
participant clicked on the “Next Item” button to proceed
to the subsequent item. If participants were unfamiliar with
a concept or property, they were instructed to skip the item
by pressing the “Next Item” button. The instruction
emphasized that there were no right or wrong answers
and that participants could give a high rating for as many or
as few of the modalities as they wished, and a low rating for
as many or as few of the modalities as they wished.
Participants were encouraged to use their first intuitions
about the items, and not to think too long about their
answers. The experiment was self-paced and lasted approx-
imately 20–30 min. The complete instructions are provided
in Appendix.
Results and discussion
The data from fourteen participants were excluded from the
analysis because they were non-native English speakers.
One other participant was excluded because he/she failed to
comply with the instructions, leaving a total of 416
participants.
The ratings provided by the participants were used to
compute mean ratings for each concept-property item. The
complete set of items and their ratings can be found in
Electronic supplementary material.
We first analyzed each item separately. For each item,
the modality with the highest mean rating was defined as
the dominant modality for that item. Table 1 shows the
distribution of items and ratings for each dominant
modality. Table 2 shows the correlations between the
ratings on each of the five modalities.
Modality exclusivity Modality exclusivity is the extent to
which a property is perceived exclusively by one modality.
Following Lynott and Connell (2009), an item’s modality
exclusivity was derived from the mean strength ratings on
the five modality scales. Modality exclusivity was computed
as the range of scores across modalities divided by the sum
of the scores. The resulting modality exclusivity scores range
from 0 to 1 (translated to 0% to 100%). A score of 0% is
obtained when equal scores are given for each modality,
indicating that the property is completely multimodal. A
score of 100% is obtained when the property is completely
experienced by one single modality. Modality-exclusivity for
individual properties ranged from 11 to 98%, with a mean of
50.6% (SD = 16.2%). Figure 1 displays the distribution of
exclusivity scores for the items grouped by dominant
modality. Exclusivity scores differed across dominant mo-
dalities, F(4, 769) = 34.60, p < .001. Posthoc tests with
Bonferroni correction revealed that the exclusivity scores of
the visual and auditory items (55%) were higher than the
scores on the other items (all p values < .001), but did not
differ from each other. The olfactory items (46%) and haptic
items (44%) did not differ from each other significantly, but
both were higher than the gustatory items (37%) (both
p values < .05).
Properties are never experienced in isolation, but are
always connected to a particular object. These objects
influence the way in which properties are perceived and
represented. As a result, a property may receive different
modality ratings depending on the concept that it is
combined with. This variance can be investigated in our
dataset, because each property occurs twice, in combination
with two different concepts. The two concept-property
items sharing the same property formed an item pair, which
could be analyzed in several ways.
Item pairs could be unidominant, with both items of the
pair having the same dominant modality (e.g., pink
FLAMINGO and pink COTTON CANDY are both predom-
inantly visual) or bidominant, with the two items having
different modalities (e.g., plain FABRIC and plain FOOD
are predominantly visual and gustatory, respectively). Our
set contained 255 unidominant pairs (66%) and 132
bidominant pairs (34%). Table 3 shows how often each
combination of dominant modalities occurs and provides
examples of each modality combination.
Interestingly, even in the unidominant item pairs, our
data show that properties are experienced differently across
concepts. For example, the property round received high
visual ratings for the concepts COIN and PLANET,
indicating that this property is experienced predominantly
visually in both concepts. The property was also rated as
strongly haptic for the concept COIN, but not for the
concept PLANET (see Fig. 2). After all, people can (and
often do) feel that a coin is round, but they never feel the
round shape of a planet. Such subtle differences in the way
in which properties are experienced are reflected in our
ratings.
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Similarity of item pairs Each concept-property item has a
specific modality profile, a five-dimensional vector repre-
senting the mean strength ratings on the five modalities. In
order to determine how similar the two modality profiles of a
particular item pair are, we computed the angle between their
two vectors. If two items have highly similar modality
profiles (e.g., spiky HEDGEHOG – spiky SEA ANEMONE),
the angle between the vectors will be small. If the profiles
are very different (e.g., honeyed COOKIES – honeyed
VOICE), the angle between the vectors will be large. Overall,
unidominant item pairs had smaller angles (M = 15.8
degrees, SD = 10.6) than bidominant pairs (M = 40.6
degrees, SD = 21.0), t(385) = 15.47, p < .001. Note,
however, that the two measures do not map completely. The
two items of a unidominant pair, while having the same
dominant modality, could have very different scores on the
remaining modalities, rendering them very dissimilar. Con-
versely, the two items of a bidominant pair could have very
similar modality profiles, while their dominant modalities
differ by a very small margin. Because the similarity measure
is based on the full modality profile, it is more sensitive to
subtle differences between the items of a pair than when one
only takes into account the dominant modalities. The angle
and the cosine of the angle of each item pair are reported in
the data file (see Electronic supplementary material).
The majority of properties used in our dataset (364 out
of 387 properties, 94%) were also normed by Lynott and
Connell (2009). By comparing our modality exclusivity
scores for this subset with the scores of Lynott and Connell
(furthermore referred to as L&C exclusivity scores), some
interesting patterns become apparent. First, our modality
exclusivity scores are slightly higher (M = 0.51, SD =
0.14) than the L&C exclusivity scores (M = 0.47, SD =
0.17), t(363) = 7.50, p < .001. This difference might be
because properties were paired with specific concepts in the
current study, whereas they were presented in isolation in
the study of Lynott and Connell. The latter may have
caused participants to represent different concepts for the
same property. For example, when asked to rate the
property rotten, one participant might form a representation
of an apple with brown spots and a mushy texture that
indicate its rottenness. Thus, this participant will rate rotten
as predominantly visual and haptic. Another participant
might instead form a representation of a rotten egg,
distinguished by its sulfuric smell. Thus, this participant
will rate rotten as predominantly olfactory. It is also
possible that a participant may represent multiple concepts
for a particular property. This participant may choose to
provide modality ratings that average across the represented
concepts. The variance in represented concepts, either
Table 1 Number of properties per dominant modality, with modality exclusivity scores and mean strength ratings (0–5) on the five perceptual
modalities
Dominant modality n Modality Exclusivity Strength
Visual Auditory Haptic Gustatory Olfactory
Visual 351 55% 4.6 0.8 2.2 0.5 0.6
Auditory 150 55% 2.7 4.7 1.1 0.1 0.3
Haptic 126 44% 3.3 0.8 4.4 0.6 0.6
Gustatory 91 37% 2.5 0.3 1.7 4.6 2.7
Olfactory 56 46% 2.0 0.5 1.0 1.7 4.4
Total 774 51% 1.5 1.0 2.2 1.1 3.6
Modality Modality
Auditory Gustatory Haptic Olfactory Visual
Auditory 1
Gustatory –0.318** 1
Haptic –0.267** –0.050 1
Olfactory –0.311** 0.615** –0.177** 1
Visual –0.238** –0.294** 0.245** –0.361** 1
Table 2 Correlation matrix for
mean strength ratings per
item on the five perceptual
modalities
Note. **p < .001 (two-tailed)
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between participants or within the same participant, will
result in lower modality exclusivity scores. Alternatively,
participants may form a generic, multimodal representation
of the property rotten, based on earlier experience but
abstracted from the specific objects with which it was
experienced. Such generic representations will result in
lower modality exclusivity scores than the more specific
representation that is formed when the property is presented
together with a particular object.
In any case, we would expect the difference between our
exclusivity scores and the L&C scores to be more pronounced
in the bidominant item pairs than in the unidominant item
pairs. This was tested by splitting the data into unidominant
and bidominant items and performing the comparison for both
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Fig. 1 Distribution of exclusivity scores, grouped by dominant modality
Type Modality combination n Example
Unidominant Auditory-Auditory 57 Howling WIND - howling WOLF
Gustatory-Gustatory 16 Sour LEMON - sour VINEGAR
Haptic-Haptic 34 Damp FOG - damp TOWEL
Olfactory-Olfactory 15 Eggy BREATH - eggy HOT SPRING
Visual-Visual 133 Red FIRETRUCK - red STRAWBERRY
Bidominant Auditory-Gustatory 3 Honeyed VOICE - honeyed COOKIES
Auditory-Haptic 8 Thumping DRYER - thumping HEADACHE
Auditory-Visual 25 Boiling KETTLE - boiling SOUP
Gustatory-Haptic 19 Bitter COFFEE - bitter COLD
Gustatory-Olfactory 16 Coconutty PINA COLADA - coconutty SUN CREAM
Gustatory-Visual 30 Dry BISCUIT - dry RIVERBED
Haptic-Olfactory 1 Light FEATHER - light COLOGNE
Haptic-Visual 30 Hairy COCONUT - hairy MAMMOTH
Olfactory-Visual 9 Burning TOAST - burning CANDLE
Table 3 Frequencies and exam-
ples of unidominant and bido-
minant item pairs by modality
combination
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Fig. 2 Modality strengths of the property round for the concepts
COIN and PLANET
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groups separately. In the unidominant items, our exclusivity
scores (M = .53, SD = .14) are similar to the L&C
exclusivity scores (M = .52, SD = .16), t(236) = 1.71, p >
.05. In the bidominant items, on the other hand, our
exclusivity scores are significantly higher (M = .47, SD =
.12) than the L&C scores (M = .35, SD = .10), t(126) =
9.85, p < .001. Figure 3 plots the proportion of unidominant
and bidominant item pairs as a function of L&C exclusivity.
The proportion of unidominant item pairs increases as
exclusivity scores become higher. This pattern indicates that
in the study of Lynott and Connell, participants might have
represented different concepts for the same property, which
increased the variance and lowered the exclusivity score
especially for those items in which the different concepts
lead to very dissimilar response vectors.
Memory experiment
Our norms show that when properties are paired with
different concepts, the resulting modality profiles can
vary widely in similarity. Next, we wanted to investigate
whether the similarity in modality profiles in our norms
reflects similarity in the mental representations of the
properties. For example, the norms indicate that the
representation of mild might be very different in the
context of CURRY than in the context of WINTER,
whereas the representation of grey might not differ so
much between ELEPHANT and PEBBLE. Previous studies
showed that both implicit (Zeelenberg, Pecher, Shiffrin, &
Raaijmakers, 2003) and explicit (Barclay et al., 1974;
Tulving & Thomson, 1973; Zeelenberg, 2005) memory
for concept nouns are sensitive to the overlap in
contextual cues at study and test. Furthermore, such
contextual effects might be due to differences in modality
specific features of the representations at study and test
(Pecher et al., 2004, 2007; Pecher, Van Dantzig, Zwaan, &
Zeelenberg, 2009). In the present study, we investigated
how memory of property words was influenced by context
(i.e., a concept word). During the study phase, property
words were presented together with one of their two
concepts (e.g., “grey elephant”). Subsequently, memory
for the property words was tested using a cued recognition
test, in which the property was presented together with
either the same concept word as in the study phase (“grey
elephant”), or with the other concept of the item pair
(“grey pebble”). We selected item pairs that had either
highly similar modality profiles (e.g., grey ELEPHANT –
grey PEBBLE) or very different modality profiles (e.g.,
mild CURRY – mild WINTER). We expected a main effect
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Fig. 3 Proportion of unidominant and bidominant item pairs as a
function of L&C exclusivity score
Table 4 Characteristics of the items of the similar modality profile items and different modality profile items (standard deviations in parentheses)
used in the memory experiment
Characteristic Similar modality profile items Different modality profile items
Property word length 6.7 (1.9) 6.0 (1.8)
Log frequency of property word 0.61 (0.58) 0.79 (0.77)
Log frequency of concept words 1.06 (0.72) 1.24 (0.74)
Cosine of modality profiles 1.00 (0.0) 0.53 (0.2)
Angle of modality profiles (in degrees) 4.9 (2.0) 57.0 (13.6)
LSA cosine (concept 1 to concept 2) 0.05 (0.11) 0.03 (0.12)
LSA cosine (property-concept item 1 to property-concept item 2) 0.32 (0.29) 0.31 (0.29)
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of concept switch; recognition of the property would be
worse if the concept was switched than if the concept was
repeated. Moreover, we expected the switch effect to be
influenced by the similarity of the modality profiles; it
should be larger for items with different modality profiles
than for items with similar modality profiles. After all, for
items with different modality profiles switching the
concept would result in very different representations of
the property during study and test, whereas this difference
would be much less pronounced for items with similar
modality profiles.
Method
Participants Twenty-five undergraduate students from the
University of California, San Diego, participated in the
experiment in return for course credits. None had participated
in the norming study. One participant did not perform the
memory task as instructed and was removed from the analysis.
Stimuli Two sets of 40 properties each were selected. Each
property was paired with the two concepts that had been
presented in the norming study. The similar modality
profile properties had very high cosines (small angles)
between the modality vectors for the two concepts,
indicating that they had very similar ratings on the sensory
modalities. The different modality profile properties had
very low cosines (large angles) between the modality
vectors for the two concepts, indicating that they had very
different ratings on the sensory modalities. The stimuli in
the two sets were matched on length of the property word,
word frequency of the property and both concept words,
and the Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) cosine between
the two concept words (Landauer & Dumais, 1997). Word
frequency norms were derived from the Celex database
(Baayen, Piepenbrock, & van Rijn, 1993). The character-
istics of the two sets of stimuli are provided in Table 4.
We created four lists to counterbalance the items. Each
participant saw only one list; six participants were assigned to
each list. Across these lists, each property was used twice in
the repeated concept condition and twice in the switch concept
condition, and for each of the two conditions a concept was
used once as study concept and once as test concept.
Examples of the conditions and counterbalancing are provid-
ed in Table 5. The resulting lists contained 20 properties in
each of the four conditions: similar profile-repeat concept,
similar profile-switch concept, different profile-repeat con-
cept, and different profile-switch concept. For the memory
test, an additional set of 80 different property-concept pairs
was created to serve as new items (distractors).
Procedure Participants were instructed to study the properties
(presented in uppercase) for a later memory test. They were
told that they should also read the concepts (presented in
lowercase) because theymight be provided at test to help them
remember the properties. Each property-concept pair was
presented for 3,500 ms in the center of the computer screen.
Condition Property Study concept Test concept Version
Different modality profile – repeat concept Mild Curry Curry 1
Winter Winter 2
Different modality profile – switch concept Mild Winter Curry 3
Curry Winter 4
Similar modality profile – repeat concept Grey Elephant Elephant 1
Pebble Pebble 2
Similar modality profile – switch concept Grey Elephant Pebble 3
Pebble Elephant 4
Table 5 Examples of the design
and counterbalancing in the
memory experiment
Condition Similar modality profile Different modality profile
Repeat concept .71 (.03) .76 (.04)
Switch concept .52 (.06) .50 (.05)
Switch effect .19 (.03) .27 (.04)
Table 6 Hit rates (standard
errors in parentheses) in the
memory experiment
Note. The false alarm rate was .18
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The property was always the left hand item of the pair and the
concept the right hand item (e.g., MILD curry). Between
items, a 500-ms blank screen was presented. The 80 items
were presented in a different random order for each
participant. The test phase started immediately after the study
phase. Participants were instructed that they would see
property-concept pairs, and their task was to indicate whether
they had studied the property in the previous phase. Theywere
told that the concept might help their memory, but that they
should indicate “old” to all studied properties, whether the
concept was studied or not. An item was presented at the
center of the screen and remained there until the participant
indicated “old” by pressing the m key or “new” by pressing
the z key. All studied items and distractors were presented in
different random order for each participant.
Results
The average hit rates per condition are shown in Table 6.
We analyzed the individual hit rates in a 2 (modality
profile) by 2 (concept switch) ANOVA. The results
showed a main effect of switch, F(1, 23) = 60.61, p <
.001, η2 = .73, indicating that memory for the properties
was better when the concept was repeated than when it
was switched. There was no main effect of modality
profile, F < 1, indicating that memory for the two sets of
properties was not different. Most interesting, there was a
significant interaction between modality profile and
concept repetition, F(1, 23) = 5.01, p < .05, η2 = .18.
As we predicted, the memory decrease due to concept
switch was larger for different modality profile properties
than for similar modality profile properties.
Conclusions
We collected modality-exclusivity norms for 387 properties,
each paired with two different concepts. The results show that
modality profiles and modality exclusivity vary widely for a
substantial proportion of properties. In a following experiment,
we showed that such variability affects recognition memory for
the properties. These results indicate that the norms reflect
something essential about the representation of properties.
When applying the property verification task or a different
verbal task to study modality-specific effects, such as the
modality-switch effect, it is important to select items carefully
based on their modality-exclusivity. This may reduce the
variability attributed to error, yielding cleaner data and larger
effect sizes, as demonstrated by the study of Lynott and Connell
(2009). Because our norms incorporate the variance of
properties across concepts, they are more specific than the
norms collected by Lynott and Connell. In order to select
items for an experiment, the two data sets can be used in
conjunction. We recommend our norms for selecting items for
a property-verification task or other verbal tasks using specific
concept-property combinations (such as the memory task
described in this paper). The norms of Lynott and Connell
might be preferred for tasks that address more general
meanings of properties.
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Appendix
Instructions
Objects can have different properties. Properties differ in
how they are experienced. Some properties are mainly
experienced by seeing (e.g., a TUBA being SHINY),
whereas others are mainly experienced by hearing (e.g., a
TUBA being LOUD). Some properties are experienced by
multiple senses.
In this experiment you will be asked to rate to what
degree object-property pairs are experienced by seeing,
hearing, feeling by touch, tasting and smelling. For each
sense, you should give a rating, ranging from 0 (is not
perceived by this sense at all) to 5 (is greatly perceived by
this sense).
(example)
Select a number by a mouse click.
Click the ‘Next Item’ button to continue to the next item.
If you are unfamiliar with an object or property, you can
skip the item by pressing the 'Next Item' button. Keep in
mind that you may give a high rating for as many or as few
of the senses as you wish, and a low rating for as many or
as few of the senses as you wish.
If you have clicked a wrong number, you can correct this by
clicking another number. However, we are interested in your
first intuitions about the items, so don't think too long about
your answers. After all, there are no right or wrong answers.
You can work at your own pace and take a short break
now and then. The experiment will take 25–30 min. If you
have any further questions, ask the experimenter. Other-
wise, press the spacebar to start the experiment.
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